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Paying for outpatient care in rural China: Cost escalation under China’s New 
Cooperative Medical Scheme 
 
 
Abstract 
China's New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS), a government subsidized health 
insurance program launched in 2003 in response to the deterioration in access to health 
services in rural areas. Although the scheme was initially designed to cover inpatient care, it 
has started to expand its benefit package to cover outpatient care since 2007. The program’s 
impacts on outpatient care costs have raised growing concern since the new initiative was 
launched, in particular regarding whether it has in fact reduced out-of-pocket (OOP) 
payments for services among rural participants. This study examines the impacts of the 
NCMS on outpatient costs by analysing data from an individual level longitudinal survey—
China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) of 2004 and 2009. This study adopted various 
health econometrics strategies, such as Two-Part Model (2PM), Heckman Selection Model 
(HSM) and Propensity Score Matching (PSM) with Differences-in-differences (DID) model 
to estimate the impacts of the NCMS on per episode outpatient cost using the CHNS of 2004 
and 2009. We find that NCMS had little impact on reducing the NCMS patients’ OOP 
payments for outpatient services and may also have contributed to an observed increase in the 
total per episode of outpatient costs billed to the insured patients. This increase was more 
pronounced among village clinics and township health centres—the backbone of the health 
system for rural residents—than at county and municipal hospitals.  
1. Introduction 
The dismantling of collective farms during the 1980s led to the demise of the Cooperative 
Medical Scheme (CMS), which had provided 90% of rural population with access to basic 
healthcare (Liu and Yi, 2004). By the early 2000s, 95% of the rural population lacked any 
form of coverage for health services (Babiarz et al., 2010, Yip and Hsiao, 2009). 
Consequently, an increasing number of the Chinese population cannot afford healthcare 
services. In 1993, around 5.2% of the Chinese people reported that they could not afford 
outpatient care when they were sick. This percentage increased to 13.8% in 1998 and to 
18.7% in 2008 (Gu, 2008).  
 
The New Cooperative Medical Scheme (NCMS) was launched in 2003 in response to the 
deterioration in access to health services in rural areas. The NCMS is a voluntary health 
insurance program heavily subsidized by the government and administered by county-level 
government agencies. The main goal of the scheme is to improve the rural population’s access 
to health services by alleviating the financial burdens of paying for healthcare. Although 
deriving its name from its predecessor, the NCMS has a number of distinct features. First, the 
program is largely subsidized by the government, and the individual subscriber’s contribution 
to the premium is relatively low. In many regions subscribers are expected to contribute only 
about 10 RMB per person per month; remaining costs are covered by central and local 
governments. Second, participation in NCMS provides rural residents access to a range of 
healthcare facilities, from village clinics to municipal hospitals, although the reimbursement 
rates for health services received differ from one facility to another. Third, NCMS is 
administered at the county level, such that while it offers the economic benefits of pooling 
across participants (unlike the old rural cooperative medical scheme), significant disparities in 
available coverage can arise across different counties. For example, in the more affluent 
eastern and coastal region, local governments are able to upsize national government 
subsidies to offer more comprehensive coverage to their residents (Barber and Yao, 2011, Lei 
and Lin, 2009). Its expansion since inception is truly remarkable: by 2012, the NCMS 
covered 97.5% of rural population in China, some 832 million people, making it arguably the 
largest health insurance program in the world (China Daily, 2012). 
 
Despite its rapid expansion, the impact of the NCMS on reducing rural residents' financial 
burdens in paying for healthcare should not be taken for granted.  Some studies reported that 
medical expenditures and OOP payments, especially for catastrophic illnesses, have indeed 
decreased since the program was inaugurated (Wagstaff et al., 2009a, Wagstaff et al., 2009c, 
Tan and Zhong, 2010, Babiarz et al., 2012), but other researchers found  that out-of-pocket 
(OOP) payment for health services remained a severe financial burden for participating rural 
households and the financial protection provided to participants was rather limited (Sun et al., 
2010, Zhang et al., 2010).  
 
Moreover, it was documented that the current provider payment mechanism based on fee-for-
service (FFS) system may give perverse incentives to providers and were not conductive to 
cost containment (Li et al., 2011). Since most healthcare facilities relied heavily on drug 
revenue and the provision of health services to survive (Latker, 1998, Yip and Hanson, 2009, 
Yip and Hsiao, 2008), insurance such as the NCMS may further exacerbate the situation. For 
instance, an alarming increase in Caesarean section rates and costs occurred in rural areas 
after the NCMS was launched (Bogg et al., 2010). Studies likewise found that over-
prescription of antibiotics in village clinics was common for patients covered by the NCMS 
(Sun et al., 2009, Bogg et al., 2010). Village clinics and township health centres in counties 
covered by the NCMS tended to generate more revenues than similar facilities in counties not 
participating in the program (Babiarz et al., 2012), and the care delivered at participating 
facilities was also found to be more costly and more sophisticated than medically necessary 
(Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008). 
 
From 2007 onwards, the NCMS started to include outpatient care in the benefit package in 
order to improve utilization of outpatient care—the most frequently used and widely 
accessible care for the rural farmers. The program has since become more comprehensive: 
since 2007 coverage has expanded from mainly catastrophic illnesses to outpatient (Xinhua, 
2012). Two main categories of catastrophic outpatient care are eligible for reimbursement. 
These include: (1) general chronic conditions, such as hypertension (phrase I and II), heart disease 
complicated by heart failure, coronary heart disease (myocardial infarction), cerebral haemorrhage and 
cerebral infarction convalescence, etc.; (2) severe chronic conditions that require specialist care, 
such as aplastic anaemia, leukaemia, haemophilia, severe mental illness, cancer chemotherapy, 
chronic renal insufficiency, dialysis, organ transplant anti-row treatment for valvular heart 
surgery, vascular stent implantation, etc. (Hao and Yuan, 2009, Hu et al., 2008, Ministry of Health 
of Shandong Province, 2008, Ministry of Health of Guangxi Province, 2007, Ministry of Health of Hei 
Long Jiang Province, 2009). For catastrophic outpatient costs, the average reimbursement rate as 
claimed by the government is around 70% at village clinics and township health centres, and 
40% at township hospitals and above (Xinhua, 2007), although actual reimbursement rates are 
much lower than claimed rates. Further, from 2007 onwards, many provinces have started to 
reimburse general outpatient care. The reimbursement rate is around 40% according to the 
government (Hao and Yuan, 2009, Hu et al., 2008).  
 
Previous studies of the NCMS mainly focused on inpatient care, and little is known about the 
impacts of this new initiative on outpatient care use in rural areas. It was evident that social 
health insurance in China may induce unnecessary use of healthcare (Yip et al., 2010, 
Wagstaff et al., 2009b, Tang et al., 2012), but whether the expanded benefit package may lead 
to cost escalation of outpatient use is still unclear. Further, the attempt to conduct an impact 
evaluation of the NCMS on health costs is not as strong as it could be. Some studies offered 
descriptive analysis by looked at average health expenditures or expenditure increase before 
and after insurance; however, more rigorous methods are need, such as modeling on 
multivariate regression analysis of individual-level data, to isolate or control other factors 
which might influence health costs, or to pinpoint how much health costs or inappropriate use 
is associated with supply-induced demand because of the existence of insurance. To shed 
light on these issues, we trace the effects of NCMS on the costs of outpatient care in data 
from the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) of 2004 and 2009. Our study aims at 
addressing these gaps by focusing on three research questions: 
1) Did the costs of outpatient care reduce from 2004 to 2009?  
2) What effects did the NCMS have on the costs of outpatients care after outpatient care 
was included in the NCMS benefit package in 2007?  
3) How did patterns of costs for outpatient care differ among different types of 
healthcare facilities?  
 
 
2. Methods 
2.1 Data source  
CHNS, the data source for the analysis presented here, is a continuing longitudinal household 
survey conducted jointly by the Carolina Population Center (U.S.) and the National Institute 
of Nutrition and Food Safety of China (North Carolina Population Center, 2009). Nine 
provinces varying substantially in terms of geography, economic development, public 
resources, and health indicators were included in the survey: Liaoning, Heilongjiang, Jiangsu, 
Shandong, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou (Figure 1). A multistage cluster 
sampling is used to randomly draw households from the nine provinces. The CHNS surveys 
contain questions on socioeconomic status, health outcomes and health services utilization, 
insurance coverage, medical providers, and health facilities that a household might use under 
selected circumstances, as well as questions about accessibility of services, time and travel 
costs, and perceived quality of care (North Carolina Population Center, 2009).   
 
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The survey data are ideal for our purposes because the survey (2004 and 2009) covered 
virtually the entire period from the inception of NCMS in 2003 through the early years after 
its expansion in outpatient coverage in 2007. Table 1 shows the rapid expansion of NCMS 
from 2004 to 2009: fewer than 5% the rural residents surveyed were covered by NCMS in 
2004, but by 2009 more than 90% subscribed. Among the nine provinces surveyed by the 
NCMS, four provinces (Henan, Hubei, Liaoning, and Guangxi) started to reimburse 
catastrophic outpatient care since 2007. By 2008, all the surveyed provinces included 
catastrophic healthcare in the NCMS benefit package, and general outpatient services in the 
NCMS benefit package (MoH of Hei Long Jiang Province, 2009, People's Daily, 2009, MoH 
of Guangxi Province, 2007, MoH of Shandong Province, 2008, Hao and Yuan, 2009, Hu et 
al., 2008).  
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Variable specifications 
The dependent variables are the occurrence of outpatient costs, and the pre-reimbursement 
(total outpatient costs before insurance claims were made) and post-reimbursement (OOP 
payments after insurance claims were made) per episode outpatient costs. Health payment is 
for a 4-week window in the CHNS. Individuals are asked to report their health payment for 
outpatient care and the percentage that can be reimbursed by the NCMS. We use these two 
variables to construct pre- and post-reimbursement per episode outpatient costs. Because the 
inflation rate is quite high in China, costs are adjusted according to the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI) for health services. According to China Statistical Yearbook  2005 and 2010, using 
2009 as the base year, CPI for 2004 is 0.927 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2005, 
National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2011) . 
 
Aside from the policy variable of interest—participation in NCMS, the model considers a set 
of factors that may influence utilization and costs of outpatient care. This includes both need 
and non-need variables of the sample population, as commonly suggested and used in the 
literatures (Hernandez Quevedo and Jimenez Rubio, 2009, Gravelle et al., 2006, Jones, 2007). 
For health need variables, we control for age, gender, and morbidity type. Morbidity is 
categorized into four types: Type 1 is no symptoms; Type 2 is fever, sore throat, cough, 
diarrhoea, stomach ache, headache, and dizziness; Type 3 is joint pain, muscle pain, rash, 
dermatitis, and eye/ear disease; Type 4 is other communicable and non-communicable 
diseases. For non-need factors, we control for household per capita income, education, job 
status, and province of residency, and season. Per capita income is constructed by using 
Equivalence Scales (Citro et al., 1995). Education is categorized into four groups: no 
education, primary and secondary education, high school and technical school education, and 
university education and above. University education and above are used as the reference 
group. Health facilities are categorized into five groups: village clinics, township hospitals, 
county and city hospitals, private clinics, and other health facilities. Village clinics are the 
reference category. For the province variable, province Guizhou is set as the reference group. 
Season is categorized into two groups, late autumn to early winter (October to December), 
and late winter to early spring (January to March). Late winter to early spring is the reference 
group. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the data set used in the analysis.  
 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Empirical strategies 
Mean comparison using longitudinal features of the data 
Three modelling approaches are used to estimate the impacts of NCMS on the cost of 
outpatient care. First, we use the panel structure of the CHNS survey to conduct a comparison 
of average per episode outpatient costs for a single group of individuals over time, between 
2004 (when none participated in NCMS) and 2009 (when all participated in NCMS). The 
CHNS is an unbalanced panel. Using the whole sample for mean comparison may cause 
selection bias, because it studies aggregate data, and individuals are not compared with 
themselves.  
 
In this analysis, it was noted that a total of the 1,954 individuals surveyed in 2004, when none 
participated in the NCMS, were re-interviewed in 2009, when all were covered by the NCMS 
(Table 3). Among these individuals, 186 of them reported outpatient cost data in 2004 and 
2009. We conducted a mean comparison based on the same individuals who had outpatient 
costs data in both survey periods, and who were uninsured in 2004 and insured in 2009. By 
using the methods, we were able to control for unobservable individual factors of the sample 
that are consistent through time. Table 4 presents the descriptive analysis of the sample 
characteristics. Two samples were identical in most of the key variables that may influence 
health use and health costs.  
 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
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2PM and HSM 
To estimate the determinants of the use, total costs, and OOP payments for outpatient care, 
pooled data from two rounds of CHNS to date (2004 and 2009) are subjected to a regression 
analysis with a 2PM that were used extensively in the health economics literature (Gravelle et 
al., 2006, Jones, 2007, O'Donnell et al., 2008). The regression analysis draw data from the 
CHNS of 2004 and 2009 and included all NCMS insured individuals and those who are not 
insured by any scheme, excluding only individuals in the sample who are participants in other 
insurance schemes. 
 
The 2PM model comprises a Probit Model for the probability that an individual has any 
outpatient costs and an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) model, applied only to the subsample 
with nonzero expenditures, to estimate correlates of the positive level of expenditure. Given 
that typically the distribution of health costs is right-skewed, invariably the log of expenditure 
is modelled in the second part OLS. Assume that the probability that outpatient cost  iy  is 
positive is determined by observable  iX1  and unobservable  i1  factors. Let  iyln  be the 
log of positive outpatient costs, with a set of control variables iX 2 , and unobservable 
factors i2 . The model can be written as follows: 
(1)     22221122 ,0|)ln(,0|)ln(  iiiiiiiii XXXyEXyyE   
 
While the 2PM assumes that two independent decisions lie behind medical expenditures, 
HSM allows the decision that seeking medical care and the choice of how much to spend can 
be influenced by distinct but correlated observable and unobservable factors.  In the latent 
variable form, the model is given by the following: 
(2) 2,1
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Assuming the two error terms are jointly normally distributed, the model can be estimated by 
the Heckman two-step procedure. The first step involves estimating a Probit Model for the 
probability of nonzero expenditures, using the results to estimate the Inverse Mills Ratio 
(IMR) to correct for selection bias. In the second step of the model, the following is 
estimated: 
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Where   is the correlation coefficient between the errors, and 2 is the standard deviation 
of )1( 12  i . The performance of Heckman Selection Model depends on the collinearity 
between the IMR and the explanatory variables in the regression equitation, and this can be 
tested using a t-ratio test.  
PSM with DID estimation 
DID is also used to measure the effect of the change of health costs induced by the NCMS. 
DID represents the difference between the pre-post, within-subject differences of the 
treatment group and control group. In order to identify treatment and control groups, we 
would need data on the same individual in both 2004 and 2009, or we would be able to 
identify the surrogate control and treatment group if we treat the dataset as repeated cross-
sectional data. However, as the CHNS is an unbalanced panel, we are not able to identify the 
surrogate control and treatment group among the individuals participated only in 2004 survey 
but not 2009 survey. Given the difficulty in identifying surrogate treatment group, DID is 
conducted on the same individual who were both surveyed in 2004 and 2009. Treatment 
group is defined as those who were not covered by the NCMS in 2004, but were covered by 
the NCMS in 2009. Control group was defined as those who were not covered by any 
insurance in either 2004 or 2009. Let t = 0 represents 2004 and t =1 represent 2009. The 
model can be written as follows,  
(5) 
ittitii TXTXy   *)ln( 3210  
Where iX is the dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the individual is in the treatment 
group and 0 if the individual is in the control group, and tT  is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 in 2009 and 0 in 2004.  
 
The premise of using DID is that the treatment is randomly assigned in the population. PSM 
is used to avoid selection bias and to ensure that all the observations are similar and randomly 
selected for receiving the NCMS. PSM estimates the effect of the NCMS, by accounting for 
the covariates that predict receiving the NCMS (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).  It constructs 
counterfactuals on an assumption that the participation in the NCMS is based on a set of 
observed characteristics. The method first predicts a conditional probability of participating in 
the NCMS given certain observable variables. It then matches each participant to one or more 
nonparticipants on the given propensity score using Kernel Function. Balancing properties of 
the matching is reported in Appendix 1. It shows that the estimated propensity score balance 
the observed characteristics well. One concern with regard to PSM is that it only takes into 
account the selection biases based on observed characteristics. Combing PSM with DID, we 
will be able to remove the selection bias resulting from unobserved characteristics are 
constant over time.  
 
For all analyses, the computation of VIF was performed, and results indicated that 
multicollinearity was not a problem. Ramsy RESET tests were also performed, and results 
showed the models had no specification problems. 
 3. Empirical results 
The comparison of per episode outpatient costs for the same group of individuals in 2004 
(pre-enrolment) and 2009 (as participants to NCMS), are presented in Table 5. The average 
gross per episode outpatient costs (total billings per episode before insurance claims were 
filed) were 308.14RMB in 2009, much higher than in 2004, when the individuals studied 
were not covered by the NCMS (t = -1.86). No significant difference was observed after the 
insurance claims were filed between the NCMS participants and the uninsured.  
 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 6 shows how per episode costs for outpatient care at different levels of health facilities 
differed for the insured and the uninsured. Gross per episode outpatient costs, before 
insurance claims are filed, are significantly higher for the insured patients if care is sought at 
village clinics, township health centres, and private clinics rather than larger facilities. For 
care sought at village clinics, gross per episode costs before insurance claims are filed are 
116.68RMB, which are 44.47RMB higher than gross costs billed to the uninsured (t = –1.92). 
Similarly, gross per episode costs for the insured at village clinics are 349.39RMB, which is 
201.09RMB higher than gross billings to the uninsured (t = –2.05). However, after claims are 
paid, no significant difference is observed in the net costs between the insured and the 
uninsured. For care sought at the higher-level health facilities (county and city hospitals), no 
significant difference is observed in costs between the insured and costs to the uninsured. 
 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 7 shows the results for 2PM and HSM. The models estimate the impacts of the NCMS 
on outpatient costs by comparing gross costs before insurance claims are filed with net costs 
after insurance claims are filed and reimbursement is paid. Occurrence of outpatient costs is 
analysed in relation to insurance, type of illness, job status, and place of residence, etc. 
Results from this second method are consistent with the regression results presented above. 
One salient finding is that the NCMS had no significant impacts on outpatient care utilization. 
Even more importantly, ceteris paribus, the NCMS has no effects on reducing participants’ 
post-reimbursement outpatient payments (indicated under ‘net after claim paid’ column in 
Table 7), and meanwhile it significantly increased the pre-reimbursement outpatient costs 
(indicated under ‘gross billed’ column in Table 7). Both 2PM and Heckman Selection Model 
show that pre-insurance costs of outpatient care for rural residents covered by NCMS are 
more than 40% higher than for the uninsured. Further, it is also noted that comparing to minor 
illness (Morbidity type 1), people who are with major illness are more likely to seek 
outpatient care.  
 
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Table 8 shows that the PSM with DID estimates for outpatient costs. The results show a trend 
of an observed increase in pre-reimbursement outpatient costs (gross billed) between the 
treatment and control group (p <0.1). The results also show that there is no significant 
difference for post-reimbursement outpatient costs (net after claims paid) that were between 
the control and treatment groups after the NCMS was launched.  
 
[TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Robustness tests 
We perform two main sets of robustness tests for the analysis. The first set of robustness test 
is performed by using both 2PM and HSM to estimate the probability of using outpatient care 
and main factors that influence outpatient costs. These two models show similar results. The 
second set of robustness test is performed on the continuous part of the regression model. The 
positive association between education and health is well established (Ross and Wu, 1995). In 
the main analysis, education is categorised into four groups (who responded 1: ‘no education’, 
2: ‘primary and secondary education’, 3: ‘high school or technical school’, 4: ‘university 
education and above’). For the robustness checks, these groups are re-categorised into five 
groups (who responded 1: ‘no education’, 2: ‘primary education’, 3: ‘secondary education’, 4: 
‘high school or technical school’, 5: ‘university education and above’). The regression model 
is then re-estimated. Robustness tests confirm the results from the 2PM and HSM models that 
outpatient costs are higher for the NCMS insured groups compared with the uninsured group 
before insurance claims are filed. No significant difference is observed for these two groups 
in terms of costs after insurance claims are filed.  
 
 
4. Discussion and conclusion  
The study has yielded some compelling new findings regarding the impact of the NCMS on 
the costs of outpatient care in rural China. Our findings indicate that outpatient treatments for 
the program’s participants incurred significantly higher per episode costs than outpatient 
treatments for the uninsured after the new initiative was implemented. This pre-
reimbursement inflation in costs of service is most noticeably observed at village clinics, 
township hospitals, and private clinics. Cost inflation for health insurance is not new and has 
been observed in countries other than China. In Chile, the availability of private health 
insurance led to increased use of high-tech obstetric practices and consequently to higher 
Caesarean delivery rates (Murray and Elston, 2005). Prescription drug insurance likewise had 
positive effects in encouraging the use of specialist care (Allin and Hurley, 2009).  In China, 
cost escalation was observed in the urban health insurance scheme, adopted some years 
before the NCMS was inaugurated for the rural population. All these programs created strong 
incentives for health providers to prescribe expensive drugs and high-technology diagnosis 
procedures, on which the profit margins were higher (Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008).  
 
Our analysis shows that during the interval covered by our study (2004-2009), one possible 
explanation for the observed increase in outpatient costs is that the availability of funds 
through patients’ insurance claims from NCMS may similarly have induced participating 
health facilities and doctors to prescribe more expensive drugs or order unnecessary 
treatments—one phenomenon that has been recognised in the existing literature (Yip et al., 
2010, Yip and Mahal, 2008, Wagstaff and Lindelow, 2008). Comparison of average per 
episode costs for outpatient care before and after rural residents subscribed to the NCMS 
yields similar findings. It appears that the NCMS is associated with an escalation in pre-
reimbursement per episode outpatient health costs (gross billings, before claims are filed) for 
its participants, even if claims filed reduce the OOP payments to a level similar to the 
nonparticipants. The regression analysis and DID analysis also reveal that the pre-
reimbursement costs for outpatient care for the NCMS participants are higher than those for 
the uninsured patients. The NCMS has limited impacts on reducing outpatient costs, while 
costs billed to the NCMS for outpatient services may continue to rise. 
 
One policy implication to be drawn from this scenario is that further infusions of government 
subsidies aimed at covering rising NCMS expenditures may simply induce further waves of 
cost escalation, unless the NCMS can use its leverage as purchaser and third-party payer to 
introduce cost-saving measures in participating health services facilities.  
 
More crucially, pressures for cost inflation appear to be stronger in village clinics and 
township health centres, where rural residents are most likely to seek outpatient care, than at 
larger facilities. Per episode costs for outpatient care at village clinics and township health 
centres are significantly higher for the NCMS patients than for the uninsured. It is widely 
believed that cost-effective care can best be delivered at low-level health facilities that are 
most accessible to rural residents. The NCMS creates incentives for its participants to seek 
care in those health facilities; the claims reimbursement rates for care delivered in these, small 
local health facilities are the highest offered by the program. Yet these small health facilities 
receive less government subsidization through the NCMS than others do, usually larger health 
facilities. The resulting financial vulnerability, coupled with the local availability of at least 
some the NCMS funding, may have led to higher charges for participants as local facilities 
struggled to make ends meet. Much of the government support intend to subsidise 
participants’ payments for healthcare may instead have been absorbed by the insatiable quest 
for revenues and cost coverage at these smaller health facilities that are most frequently 
visited by rural residents. 
 
Given these considerations, it is not surprising that the rapid expansion of the NCMS through 
massive injection of government subsidies has so far had limited impacts on either improving 
access or reducing OOP payments for outpatient care at participating health facilities. In fact, 
our analysis indicates that rural residents covered by the NCMS are less likely to seek 
outpatient care than those uninsured residents who did not subscribe to the program. There is 
no evidence from our analysis that the NCMS has reduced OOP payment for outpatient care. 
Providers, seeking to offer more care, ultimately increase total costs of outpatient care, such 
that financial benefits to patients in the form of claim reimbursements through the NCMS are 
largely dissipated by the costs of this enhanced service, providing no overall cost savings to 
outpatient participants.  
 
In thinking of the policy implications, we must bear the limitations in mind. The first 
concerns the dataset. The dataset used is probably by far the most comprehensive ever used in 
studying health inequality in the Chinese context; however, only nine provinces are included. 
Most of these provinces are situated in the eastern and coastal part of China, where the levels 
of economic development are high. Hence, any further generalisation should be made with 
caution. Secondly, outpatient costs are influenced by supply as well as demand. Because the 
CHNS survey does not include specific data on some potentially important factors influencing 
the supply side, such as number of doctors in a health facility, ownership structure of health 
facilities, and number of health facilities in specific localities, the effects of these factors on 
the costs of outpatient care could not be assessed in our analysis. The third limitation is that 
the recall period of healthcare use is only 4 weeks. This might be problematic because the 
stochastic nature of healthcare needs means that they might be sufficiently captured by a 4 
weeks window (O'Donnell et al., 2008).  
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Table 1Sample NCMS participants/non-participants covered by CHNS Survey years 
Year Uninsured (%)   Insured (%) Total 
2004 4,139 (95.79) 182 (4.22) 4,321 
2009 280(6.86) 3,804 (93.14) 4,084 
 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics for the study population (mean/standard deviation) 
Variable Definition Mean Std. Dev. 
Need variables    
    
    Age   46.481 14.571 
    Gender  Dummy variable: 1, Male; 0 Female 0.503 0.500 
    Morbidity type 1* 
Dummy variable: 1, fever, sore throat, cough, 
diarrhea, stomachache, headache, and dizziness; 0 
otherwise 
0.821 0.384 
    Morbidity type 2 
Dummy variable: 1, joint pain, muscle pain,  rash, 
dermatitis, and eye/ear disease; 0 otherwise 
0.088 0.284 
    Morbidity type 3 Dummy variable: 1, infectious disease; 0 otherwise 0.045 0.208 
    Morbidity type 4 
Dummy variable: 1, non-communicable diseases; 0 
otherwise 
0.046 0.209 
Non-need variables    
    
    Per capita income  Per capita household income is inflated to year 2009 9.527 0.869 
    Job status Dummy variable: 1, Employed; 0 otherwise 0.784 0.411 
    No edu Dummy variable: 1, No education; 0 otherwise 0.222 0.415 
    Pri/sec edu 
Dummy variable: 1, Primary and secondary 
education; 0 otherwise 
0.620 0.485 
    High school/tech edu 
Dummy variable: 1, High school and technical school 
education; 0 otherwise 
0.129 0.336 
    Uni and above edu* 
Dummy variable: 1, University and above education; 
0 otherwise 
0.021 0.144 
    Province Liaoning Dummy variable: 1 Liaoning, 0 otherwise 0.118 0.323 
    Province Heilongjiang Dummy variable: 1 Heilongjiang, 0 otherwise 0.102 0.302 
    Province Jiangsu Dummy variable: 1 Jiangsu, 0 otherwise 0.118 0.323 
    Province Shandong Dummy variable: 1 Shandong, 0 otherwise 0.109 0.312 
    Province Henan Dummy variable: 1 Henan, 0 otherwise 0.098 0.297 
    Province Hubei Dummy variable: 1 Hubei, 0 otherwise 0.108 0.310 
    Province Hunan Dummy variable: 1 Hunan, 0 otherwise 0.086 0.280 
    Province Guangxi Dummy variable: 1 Guangxi, 0 otherwise 0.136 0.342 
    Province Guizhou* Dummy variable: 1 Guizhou, 0 otherwise 0.125 0.331 
    Season Dummy variable: 1 Sep. to Dec., 0 Jan. to Mar. 0.546 0.498 
Note: *reference groups.  
 
Table 3 Sample distribution by NCMS participation for 2004 and 2009 
 
  
2009 (N = 4,084) 
Insured with 
NCMS 
Uninsured 
with NCMS 
Not 
surveyed in 
2009 
2004 
(N = 
4,321) 
Insured with 
NCMS 
81 1 100 
Uninsured with 
NCMS 
1,954 120 2,065 
Not surveyed in 
2004 
1,769 159 0 
 
 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics for the study population for Empirical Strategy 1 (mean/standard 
deviation) 
  2004 (N =186) 2009 (N = 182) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Age 49.555 11.547 55.141 11.575 
Gender 1.548 0.499 1.566 0.497 
Household expenditures 4346.565 5132.607 4828.061 7003.482 
4 week illness 0.785 0.412 0.786 0.411 
Morbidity type 2 0.516 0.501 0.357 0.480 
Morbidity type 3 0.237 0.426 0.324 0.469 
Morbidity type 4 0.215 0.412 0.297 0.458 
Village clinics 0.355 0.480 0.379 0.487 
Township hospitals 0.231 0.423 0.225 0.419 
County/city hospitals 0.188 0.392 0.198 0.399 
Private clinics 0.177 0.383 0.154 0.362 
Other health facilities 0.048 0.215 0.044 0.206 
Job status 0.780 0.415 0.780 0.415 
No edu 0.269 0.445 0.352 0.479 
Pri and sec edu 0.608 0.490 0.604 0.490 
High school 0.118 0.324 0.044 0.206 
Uni and above 0.005 0.073 0.000 0.000 
Province Liaoning 0.129 0.336 0.088 0.284 
Province Heilongjiang 0.059 0.237 0.049 0.217 
Province Jiangsu 0.005 0.073 0.000 0.000 
Province Shandong 0.032 0.177 0.049 0.217 
Province Henan 0.183 0.388 0.187 0.391 
Province Hubei 0.220 0.416 0.104 0.307 
Province Hunan 0.027 0.162 0.033 0.179 
Province Guangxi 0.177 0.383 0.335 0.473 
Province Guizhou 0.167 0.374 0.154 0.362 
season 0.559 0.498 0.258 0.439 
 
 
Table 5 per episode outpatient costs for the insured and uninsured 
 
Uninsured (2004)   
(n = 186) 
Insured (2009)  
(n = 182) 
Difference t-stat 
Gross billed 205.43 308.14 –102.71 –1.86* 
Net after claim paid 205.43 253.81 –48.38 –0.93 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *, p < 0.1 
 
Table 6 Medical costs per treatment episode, for the insured and uninsured, at different levels of 
health facilities 
 
 
Uninsured  
(2004)  
( N = 186) 
Insured  
(2009)   
(N = 182) 
Difference t-stat 
Village clinics 66 69   
 Gross billed 72.21 116.68 –44.47 –1.92* 
 Net after claim paid 72.21 97.77 –25.56 –1.14 
Township  health centres 43 41   
 Gross billed 139.30 349.39 –210.09 –2.05** 
 Net after claim paid 139.30 244.20 –104.90 –1.24 
City/county hospitals 35 36   
 Gross billed 618.12 683.89 –65.77 –0.34 
 Net after claim paid 618.12 569.72   48.40   0.26 
Private clinics 33 28   
 Gross billed 52.31 289.29 –236.98 –2.04** 
 Net after claim paid 52.31 289.29 –236.98 –2.04 
Other 9 8   
Gross billed 454.91 123.13   331.78   1 .00 
Net after claim paid 454.91 103.11   351.80   1.06 
Note: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *, p < 0.1 
Table 7 Regression results for outpatient medical costs for 2004 and 2009 
  2PM HSM 
  Gross billed Net after claims paid Gross billed Net after claims paid 
  Participation Continuous Participation Continuous Participation Continuous Participation Continuous 
  Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS Probit OLS 
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Insurance 0.065 0.343*** 0.052 0.098 0.046 0.415*** 0.052 0.098 
Age 0.02 0.008 0.02 0.008 0.024* 0.017 0.02 0.008 
Age2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Gender -0.133** 0.085 -0.107* 0.117 -0.131** -0.044 -0.107* 0.115 
Morbidity type 2 2.558*** -0.534** 2.538*** -0.428* 2.534*** 2.245*** 2.538*** -0.377 
Morbidity type 3 2.15*** 0.106 2.17*** 0.214 2.154*** 2.503*** 2.17*** 0.259 
Morbidity type 4 2.62*** 0.957*** 2.621*** 1.039*** 2.63*** 3.77*** 2.621*** 1.091 
Per capita income (lg) 0.031 -0.044 0.017 -0.023 0.037 -0.024 0.017 -0.022 
Job status 0.083 0.006 0.091 -0.044 0.073 0.106 0.091 -0.042 
No edu -0.345 -0.75 -0.367 -0.756 -0.383 -1.017 -0.368 -0.762 
Pri and sec edu -0.261 -0.668 -0.297 -0.724 -0.291 -0.872 -0.297 -0.729 
High school -0.46 -0.616 -0.495 -0.597 -0.487 -0.996 -0.496 -0.605 
Province Liaoning -0.279** 0.944*** -0.285** 1.077*** -0.289** 0.709*** -0.285** 1.072*** 
Province Heilongjiang -0.379** 0.619** -0.375** 0.504 -0.386*** 0.273 -0.375** 0.497 
Province Jiangsu 0.184 0.483** 0.203 0.668*** 0.154 0.675** 0.203 0.671** 
Province Shandong 0.003 0.41 0.025 0.139 -0.023 0.464 0.025 0.14 
Province Henan 0.37*** 0.027 0.384*** 0.181 0.371*** 0.346 0.384*** 0.187 
Province Hubei 0.092 0.409* 0.017 0.447* 0.064 0.537** 0.017 0.448* 
Province Hunan -0.074 0.778*** -0.134 0.906*** -0.092 0.723** -0.134 0.903*** 
Province Guangxi 0.459*** 0.096 0.425*** 0.266 0.424*** 0.534** 0.425*** 0.273 
Season -0.272*** 0.114 -0.328*** 0.046 -0.272*** -0.118 -0.328*** 0.041 
Constant -3.063*** 4.758*** -2.883*** 4.488*** -3.159*** 0.594 -2.882*** 4.41* 
  N = 7717 N = 730 N = 7717 N = 711 N = 7717 N = 730 N = 7717 N = 711 
  LR chi2(21) = 2547.26 F( 21, 708) = 9.65 LR chi2(21) =2487.31 F( 21, 689) = 7.5 Rho = 0.7696349   Rho = 0.0174707   
  Prob > chi2 = 0 Prob > chi2 = 0 Prob > chi2 = 0 Prob > chi2 = 0 
LR test of Rho = 0:  p = 0.0133 LR test of Rho = 0:   p  = 0.9706 
          
  Pseudo R2 = 0.5272 R2 = 0.2042 Pseudo R2 = 0.5242 R2 = 0.186 Wald chi2(21) = 175.23 Wald chi2(21) = 161.65 
          Prob > chi2 = 0   Prob > chi2 = 0   
(Note: *** p  < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *, p < 0.1) 
 
Table 8 DID results with PSM for outpatient costs before the NCMS deduction and after the 
NCMS deduction 
  Before reimbursement (N = 351) 
  Control Treated Diff(2004) Control Treated Diff(2009) Diff-in-diff  
Outpatient cost (lg) 5.108 4.146 -0.962 3.854 4.668 0.814 1.777* 
S.E. 0.567 0.124 0.581 0.926 0.122 0.934 1.1 
R2             0.238 
  After Reimbursement (N = 344) 
  Control Treated Diff(2004) Control Treated Diff(2009) Diff-in-diff  
Outpatient cost (lg) 3.976 4.141 0.165 4.390 4.402 0.012 -0.153 
S.E. 0.547 0.128 0.561 0.669 0.126 0.681 0.883 
R2             0.233 
(Note: *** p  < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, *, p < 0.1.  DID model used include age, gender, morbidity types, per 
capita income, job status, province and season variables. ) 
Figure 1. Map of Survey Regions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
